Record found
The selector resolves to a DKIM public-key record. Confirm live mail uses the same selector and signing domain.
Verify that a DKIM selector publishes a usable public key for your sending domain.
DKIM—DomainKeys Identified Mail—adds a cryptographic signature to outgoing email. The sending service signs selected message headers with a private key, while the matching public key is published in DNS. A receiving system uses that public key to confirm that the signed content was not altered after it left the authorized sender.
DKIM records are selector-specific. A provider might use selector1, google, k1 or another value, and publish the key at selector._domainkey.yourdomain.com. Selectors let organizations rotate keys and operate more than one sending platform without placing every key in the same DNS record.
A DNS record alone does not prove that live messages are being signed. It confirms that a receiver can discover a public key for the selector you supplied. A complete test should also inspect the DKIM-Signature header on a real message and confirm that the signing domain aligns with the visible From domain for DMARC.
Use the domain that appears in the DKIM signing identity, normally your business domain.
Find it in the provider’s DNS instructions or the s= value of a DKIM-Signature header.
The checker reads selector._domainkey.domain as a public TXT record.
It reports whether a usable DKIM value was found and shows the returned DNS evidence.
The selector resolves to a DKIM public-key record. Confirm live mail uses the same selector and signing domain.
The queried hostname returned no usable key. Check the selector, DNS hostname and whether the provider has finished generating the key.
A TXT value exists but does not look like a valid DKIM record. Recopy the provider value without smart quotes, line breaks or a duplicated hostname.
The resolver did not complete the query. No failure is assumed; wait briefly and run the check again.
Selectors cannot be enumerated reliably from DNS. Read the provider’s setup screen or a delivered message header and enter the exact selector value.
Many DNS dashboards automatically append the zone name. Confirm the final published name is selector._domainkey.example.com, not that name repeated twice.
DNS may safely split a long key into quoted fragments, but stray spaces or copied quotation marks can corrupt it. Prefer the provider’s copy control.
After rotation, verify new messages use the new selector before removing the old key. Keep the overlap long enough for delayed messages to be verified.
Practical answers about this checker and the signal it evaluates.
Check your email provider’s domain-authentication page. You can also inspect a delivered message’s DKIM-Signature header and look for the s= tag. The d= tag identifies the signing domain.
Yes. Each selector has its own DNS name, which supports multiple providers and safe key rotation. A single selector should resolve predictably to the key expected by its sender.
No. DKIM authenticates signed message content; it does not hide the message. Transport encryption such as TLS protects supported connections while a message moves between systems.
The DKIM signing domain may not align with the visible From domain, or another part of the message may invalidate the signature. Review the d= domain, selector and authentication-results header.